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This article examines the ways in which key environmental 
policies have been made in the past, and reflects on the 
present state of play with respect to these policies. The article 
draws on my experience with the Environmental Defence 
Society (EDS) since 1978 and the reflections are personal 
ones. The issues covered are: government agencies; climate 
change; oceans; freshwater; and resource management law. 
The objective of this discussion is to see if the past illuminates 
the present in any useful way.
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forms of reserves and environmental 
health. (Cullen, 1983)
The environmental movement 
had joined together – not for the last 
time – and contended that we needed 
a focused ministry as an alternative to 
the ‘scattered green blobs’ approach 
whereby each government agency had 
its own environmental capacity. In 
Environmental Administration in New 
Zealand: an alternative discussion paper, 
released by six environmental groups in 
January 1985, it was noted that an era of 
‘confrontation politics … in which the 
formidable machinery of the State was 
used for single-minded promotion of 
natural resource exploitation’ had come to 
an end (Royal Forest and Bird Protection 
Society et al., 1985). The expectation was 
that a reorganised public service would 
promote the concept of sustainability 
as an alternative to the then discredited 
‘Think Big’ era of the earlier 1980s.
What eventuated was that instead of a 
single large entity which had both policy 
and operational functions, the Labour 
government created a more tightly focused 
Ministry for the Environment, with 
operational functions largely delegated 
to territorial councils. At the time it was 
Government agencies: then 
In 1984 a Labour government was elected 
with a policy of restructuring the public 
service to create a Ministry for the 
Environment. The spokesperson on the 
environment for Labour, Michael Cullen, 
said in June 1983:
The time has arrived for the creation 
of a Ministry for the Environment, 
a full-fledged Department of State. 
Such a Ministry would be responsible 
for advice and the co-ordination and 
implementation of environmental 
policy. It would incorporate within 
it a number of existing divisions 
of other departments most notably 
those relating to wildlife, water and 
soil conservation, native forests, 
national parks and reserves, other 
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described as being to the environment 
what Treasury is to the economy: a so-
called control agency.
Labour also created a separate 
Department of Conservation to run the 
new protected lands, responsibility for 
which had been assimilated from the 
old Forest Service and Lands and Survey 
Department. The Wildlife Service was 
also folded into the department. The 
enabling act gave it special functions for 
the management of public resources: 
freshwater and the coastal environment. 
It was also given the role of being an 
advocate for nature on private land.
The department had a troubled 
start. During its first three years of life 
it had three different ministers and 
three directors-general. It went through 
a major restructuring in 1989, only two 
years after its establishment, as a result 
of which 188 staff were made redundant, 
a management tier was removed, and 
regional conservators now reported 
directly to the director-general. A minor 
review during 1993 and 1994 led to a 
further 38 staff being made redundant 
to save costs. Funding was so tight that 
by 1995 ‘vehicles were put up on blocks 
owing to lack of funds for running them’ 
(Eriksen et al., 2004).
A defining point in the department’s 
history was the Cave Creek disaster in 
April 1995, when a viewing platform in 
the Paparoa National Park collapsed, 
killing 14 people. The political fallout 
was significant, absorbing much 
management and staff attention, and 
the department went through another 
restructuring a year later. This reduced 
the number of conservancies from 14 to 
13 and established three regional offices. 
Restructuring has been a regular feature 
of the department’s life since.
The administrative reforms that 
created the Ministry for the Environment 
and the Department of Conservation in 
the late 1980s were the result of some 
effective lobbying by civil society. There 
were town hall meetings, the presence of 
environmental lobbyists in the corridors of 
Parliament, the production of discussion 
papers and pamphlets and the expending 
of a lot of energy. A groundswell of 
public support in the early 1980s led to 
Labour making reform commitments 
prior to its election; though it was very 
much a reforming government. It is fair 
to say that, although it has been tinkered 
with over the years, the environmental 
framework that was created has remained 
intact: it has stood the test of time. To 
the best of my knowledge no credible 
political party is advocating fundamental 
structural change to either the Ministry 
for the Environment or the Department 
of Conservation. 
Government agencies: now
Recently, however, further restructuring 
of the Department of Conservation has 
created two new divisions, an operating 
division (Conservation Services) and a 
partnerships division (Conservation Part-
nerships) (Department of Conservation, 
2013). The partnerships division seems 
based on the assumption that there is a 
lot of voluntary and sponsorship support 
for the department in the corporate and 
non-government sectors, and that the de-
partment needs to be divided to best ap-
propriate that support. 
This has been a very difficult reform 
to understand. One can imagine that 
the department might have piloted such 
a scheme on a smaller scale; to embark 
on such an experiment seems risky when 
there are no guarantees that the expected 
level of sponsor and volunteer interest 
will manifest itself. It is also hard to say 
how the collapse of many conservancies 
into a less-devolved structure will work.
It means, too, that the department is 
now competing for sponsorship funding, 
as a government entity funded by tax 
revenues, with the third sector: groups 
such as EDS, WWF-New Zealand and 
Forest and Bird. Funding for the third 
sector is very limited too, and it seems 
unfair to have this hugely-resourced 
government entity in direct competition 
with not-for-profit environmental NGOs. 
At the same time, the department has 
been progressively reducing its statutory 
advocacy role with respect to nature on 
private land. This also puts more pressure 
on the thin green line of environmental 
NGOs, and Fish and Game, to take up the 
slack, while also being asked to continue 
and even extend voluntary effort. So it 
is a double strike more competition for 
scarce sponsorship dollars while at the 
same time more work is being pushed 
our way.
In contrast to the process that created 
the Department of Conservation, there 
was no external consultation about 
these changes. It was an initiative led 
by the director-general and conducted 
entirely in-house. Restructuring is, of 
course, a chief executive’s prerogative. 
However, in this case it has serious 
implications for other parties, is a major 
restructuring which could have benefited 
from some external input, and relates 
to the conservation estate which the 
department manages with assistance from 
many NGOs. The department is now a 
different creature; and the new director-
general may have his own views on 
further change. While change has been a 
part of the department since its creation, 
and refreshing the way things are done 
is valid, too much change is debilitating 
and inevitably sees a loss of knowledge 
and experience. The department needs a 
period of stability, but I question whether 
it has the right platform in place.
Climate change: then
Here I want to traverse the creation of 
New Zealand’s policy responses to climate 
change, clearly the biggest environmental 
issue facing the planet today. 
A defining point in the [Department of 
Converstion’s] history was the Cave Creek disaster 
in April 1995, when a viewing platform in the 
Paparoa National Park collapsed, killing 14 people.
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The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated 
in 1997, and the minister for the 
environment, Simon Upton, signed New 
Zealand up to it in 1998. It was ratified by 
the Helen Clark-led Labour government 
in December 2002. Ratification brought 
with it legally-binding obligations to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. During 
the first commitment period, 2008–12, 
New Zealand was required to reduce 
emissions to 1990 levels, or to top up 
any shortfall by way of the appropriate 
emission units.
While New Zealand was committing 
itself to being part of the international 
effort to address anthropogenic climate 
change, intensive work was going 
on within government to create an 
appropriate domestic policy response. 
This focused on creating what was 
described as a fiscally-neutral carbon tax, 
aimed at putting an effective price signal 
into the economy that would stimulate 
carbon reductions. Some complementary 
policies would sit alongside that. In 
terms of the wider context of this work, 
it proved to be perhaps the most divisive 
environmental debate of our time. We 
saw extraordinarily venomous tirades 
from the far right, from climate change 
deniers, from contrarians and from 
normally reasonable newspaper leader 
writers. We even saw a tractor being 
driven up the steps of Parliament by a 
National MP, with Federated Farmers as 
a cheerleader. 
In the end, the carbon tax proposal 
failed when the government changed 
in 2005 and the support parties of the 
new, Labour-led government rejected it. 
The new government then looked at an 
emissions trading scheme. The Labour 
minister for climate change issues, 
David Parker, set up a Climate Leaders 
Forum (which in many respects operated 
analogously to the later Land and Water 
Forum). This sought to give the minister 
advice on domestic price signals for 
climate change in our economy from 
an eclectic range of stakeholders. The 
Labour government passed the Climate 
Change Response (Emissions Trading) 
Amendment Act 2008 into law just before 
it went out of office. The subsequent 
National-led government amended it, but 
kept the structure largely intact.  
As noted earlier, climate change policy 
was an example of extreme polarisation 
of interests. But in the end Parliament 
at least agreed on a framework for a 
domestic carbon price, although there 
remain profound differences about how 
deeply that pricing signal should bite 
and who should pay. Interestingly, the 
environmental movement was somewhat 
divided on the relative merits of a carbon 
tax versus an emissions trading scheme. 
That remains the case to the present.
Climate change: now
We have now moved out of the intensive 
conflict phase into one where the issue 
has become something of a ‘sleeper’. 
Federated Farmers has become more 
progressive and less climate-denying, 
which has contributed to the tonal shift in 
the domestic debate. And, of course, the 
science keeps moving on and the sceptics 
keep moving out. But at the same time 
– and I think this is partly because of a 
lack of effective communication from the 
scientific community in New Zealand, at 
least until recently – the climate change 
issue has virtually slipped from public 
view, notwithstanding that the northern 
hemisphere has tipped over the critical 
400ppm CO2 mark, and that New 
Zealand is expected to do so in the next 
few years (Ministry for the Environment 
et al., 2009). 
One reason for the policy slumber is 
that the government is not particularly 
interested in adding what it sees as a bur-
den to an already struggling economy. 
Indeed, it is heading in exactly the op-
posite direction, promoting the expan-
sion of oil, gas and coal production as a 
core part of its economic strategy. Rather 
than reducing our use of fossil fuels, we 
are increasing it. In addition, the climate 
change minister has been preoccupied 
with other matters. Trade interests and 
New Zealand’s United Nations ambitions 
trump climate change in our interna-
tional positioning, and it is hard to see 
a minister who appears to be out of the 
country more than he is in it, and with 
such a big workload, taking a keen and 
active interest in pushing domestic policy 
along in a progressive way.
Internationally, we have clearly taken 
a significant reputational hit with our 
decision not to ratify Kyoto 2, the second 
phase of the Kyoto Protocol. Instead we 
have adopted a Clayton’s position, where 
we are going to set a target and abide 
by the Kyoto 2 rules but not join it. The 
minister states that this is because there is 
a need to bring developing countries into a 
new framework, a point with which those 
countries that have signed up to Kyoto 2 
would agree. We seem to have taken a 
perverse stance which is destroying a lot 
of the goodwill New Zealand built up in 
the international negotiations over many 
years.
Domestically, the carbon price is still 
extremely weak and the emissions trading 
scheme is not working as envisaged.  Key 
emitters continue to be shielded, and there 
are large investments in dairy conversions 
supported by government subsidies and 
investment support for irrigation. The 
Ministry for Primary Industries wants 
to double the value of primary sector 
exports by 2025. Foresters are giving up 
and potential carbon sinks are being 
converted to emissions-intensive dairying. 
So there is no effective price signal that 
is going to change behaviour, and any 
moral authority that New Zealand may 
have had internationally is gone. 
Why did this happen? Part of the rea-
son is that climate change is a long-lived, 
extraordinarily difficult and complex 
policy issue, and it takes a lot of resources 
to maintain effective engagement. While 
some in the environmental movement are 
actively involved in climate change work, 
for others it takes a back seat to what are 
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Internationally, we have clearly taken a significant 
reputational hit with our decision not to ratify  
Kyoto 2, the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.
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seen as more pressing and immediate 
matters. It is time, in fact, to hit the re-
fresh key on this issue, and, to this end, 
in October leading environmental NGOs 
will be getting together to see how we can 
re-energise the climate change debate.
Oceans policy: then
I next want to look at oceans policy and 
the current interest in offshore oil, gas and 
mining. 
Modern ocean policy had its inception 
in 1999, when officials were directed to 
investigate current arrangements for the 
management of New Zealand’s marine 
environment. Shortly thereafter, the 
parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment released a report entitled 
Setting Course for a Sustainable Future: 
the management of New Zealand’s marine 
environment, which identified a number 
of problems with the current system 
for managing New Zealand’s oceans, 
and recommended the establishment 
of a Coastal and Oceans Task Force 
to develop a strategy for future 
sustainable management (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 
1999). In July 2000 Cabinet endorsed 
a proposal to prepare an oceans policy 
for New Zealand, and in March 2001 
a ministerial advisory committee was 
appointed to manage and lead the 
process of ‘identifying the shared vision, 
goals and objectives of New Zealanders 
for managing New Zealand’s oceans’.
Between June and August 2001 the 
committee undertook an extensive 
consultation process. A stocktake of 
legislation having an impact on oceans 
was completed in December 2002 and 
identified a number of weaknesses in 
the overall oceans management system. 
These included the absence of an 
overriding goal; inconsistent decision-
making structures; opportunities for 
participation and management of like 
activities; ecologically arbitrary spatial 
management units; and a general lack 
of integrated management (Willis, Gunn 
and Hill, 2002).
The process came to a halt in July 2003 
as a result of the controversy over Mäori 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed. 
However, a work stream continued to 
focus on achieving better management 
of the environmental effects of activities 
within the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). In June 2005 the Ministry for the 
Environment released a report, Offshore 
Options, which canvassed alternatives 
(Ministry for the Envirnoment, 2005). 
It recommended that a voluntary 
approach be adopted in the short term, 
but that overlay regulation, modelled on 
Australia’s Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, be 
prepared in the longer term.
In August 2007 the ministry released 
a more substantial discussion paper on 
the issue which took a different approach 
(Ministry for the Envirnoment, 2007). This 
ultimately resulted in Cabinet approval 
of proposals for an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (Environmental Effects) Act (EEZ 
Act). Drafting of the bill commenced in 
2008; however, this work was also put on 
hold when the government changed after 
the November 2008 general election.
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster 
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 
brought to the fore the dangers of New 
Zealand’s lax environmental regulation 
within its exclusive economic zone. When 
announcing the expansion of the newly-
established Environmental Protection 
Authority (EPA) in May 2010, the 
minister for the environment indicated 
that the EPA could potentially undertake 
a consenting role under proposed EEZ 
legislation. 
Oceans policy: now
The ocean is the last frontier. It has been, 
until quite recently, the wild west in terms 
of environmental regulation: there has 
been no effective environmental control 
over activities in our seas. New Zealand’s 
ocean territory is the fourth largest in 
the world, which is extraordinary for a 
country of our size and population. While 
there is a lot of interest in resources out 
there, how real that interest proves to be 
remains to be seen. Some mining proposals 
are advancing through the consenting 
process: for example, an application by 
Chatham Rise Phosphate is expected to 
be notified shortly. And, of course, there 
is a considerable interest in oil and gas 
exploration. 
EDS saw some years ago that there was 
growing pressure on our oceans resource 
and that someone needed to be doing 
some serious thinking about it. It has 
therefore been the focus of a substantial 
portion of our policy work. Initially we 
looked at the need for an environmental 
protection authority. We saw that an EPA 
could evolve into an oceans regulator, 
and produced a paper that looked at such 
authorities around the world. It was, I 
think, influential in the overall outcome, 
particularly in the establishment of the 
EPA as an independent Crown entity. 
The EPA is now the oceans regulator 
under the EEZ Act. The Act saw some 
spirited domestic debate about what it 
should contain and what its purpose and 
principles should be. Getting the early, 
unacceptable draft fixed took considerable 
effort from the environmental NGO 
community. Ultimately the act was passed 
in a reasonably acceptable form. There 
remains, however, an issue regarding 
the way the EPA boards of inquiry are 
appointed: it is a political process and 
is therefore open to stacking of panels 
with people with an axe to grind or with 
political affiliations, rather than people 
selected purely on the basis of their 
expertise and objectivity. This is in stark 
contrast to the Environment Court, with 
its independent status and expertise.
The Act and associated regulations 
came into force on 28 June 2013. The 
regulations identify which activities have 
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf 
of Mexico in April 2010 brought to the fore the 
dangers of New Zealand’s lax environmental 
regulation within its exclusive economic zone.
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‘permitted activity’ status under the 
act and the conditions for undertaking 
those activities without a marine 
consent. Generally, the regulations 
set out requirements for pre-activity 
notification, consultation with Mäori 
and post-activity reporting to the EPA. 
The regulations also require operators 
wishing to carry out certain activities to 
undertake environmental assessments, 
and to have in place contingency plans in 
case something goes wrong.
The minister has been extensively 
lobbied by the petroleum sector, which 
is seeking to gain short-term advantage 
from having a government supportive 
of resource exploitation, over achieving 
longer-term stability and policy certainty. 
A second round of consultation is to 
commence shortly, with the minister, 
Amy Adams, having indicated that she 
is going to amend the EEZ Act to create 
a new category called ‘non-notified 
discretionary’ for oil and gas exploration 
drilling. That effectively means that the 
EPA will process consents for exploration 
wells in-house with no formal public 
comment. When one considers that the 
Deepwater Horizons well in the Gulf 
of Mexico was an exploration well, and 
the extent of damage that can occur 
if something goes wrong, it seems an 
extraordinary proposition to exclude the 
public, minimise transparency, and give 
an industry group operating in our deep 
oceans a pass-through process in which 
there is no rigour, no ability to cross-
examine applicants as to their reputation 
and experience, and no opportunity 
for the calling of expert evidence to 
discuss the environmental effects of 
what is proposed on marine mammals 
or other valued oceans ecosystems. All 
of that, coupled with politicisation of 
the decision-making process, is of real 
concern. It is an issue that will burgeon 
into a much bigger and more public one 
in the second half of this year.
Marine reserves: then
New Zealand was one of the first countries 
to consider the development of legislation 
that would provide for the spatial 
protection of the marine environment. 
In 1965 Professor Chapman, chairman 
of the University of Auckland’s Leigh 
Marine Laboratory Committee, wrote 
to the government Marine Department 
to suggest that a no-take marine reserve 
in front of the laboratory be established. 
He argued that this would enable the area 
to be restored to its natural state, thus 
improving the effectiveness of scientific 
study there (Ballantine, 1991). Six years 
later, in 1971, the Marine Department 
released a draft bill, and the Marine 
Reserves Act was subsequently passed. 
The University of Auckland then made 
an application for the establishment of 
a marine reserve in front of the Leigh 
Laboratory. This first application was 
rejected, another submitted in 1973, and 
finally accepted in 1975, making the Cape 
Rodney–Okakari Point marine reserve the 
first to be established in New Zealand. It 
was also one of the first no-take marine 
reserves to be established under specially-
designed legislation anywhere in the world. 
The act was brought about by intensive 
lobbying from the scientific community, 
rather than as a result of government 
having a specific desire to implement 
measures for marine protection (Mulcahy 
and Peart, 2010). 
More recently the Marine Reserves Bill 
was introduced into Parliament on 7 June 
2002, passed its first reading in October 
that year and was referred to the Local 
Government and Environment Select 
Committee. The bill aimed to resolve 
what were seen as the key problems with 
the Marine Reserves Act 1971, and which 
rendered it inconsistent with current 
government policy, in particular the 
government’s biodiversity strategy. The 
act also only applied to the territorial sea. 
Progress of the bill through Parliament 
then stalled for a decade, however, and 
the creation of new marine reserves 
slowed to a trickle.
Marine reserves: now
Earlier this year the minister of conser-
vation created a new marine reserve 
in Akaroa Harbour after more than a 
decade in process. There the obstacle 
was a difference of opinion between local 
iwi and fishers, and the Akaroa Harbour 
Marine Protection Society. Initially the 
minister declined the application. EDS 
provided legal assistance to the society, 
and the decision was overturned in the 
High Court. This was an instance where 
litigation played a critical role in policy-
making. It demonstrates the importance 
of having appeal and judicial review 
entitlements to keep errant ministers in 
check. It was also a poor process, as this 
application and many others before it 
were mired in conflict and controversy. It 
was the last application of its kind in the 
pipeline.
The difficulties with implementing 
marine reserves led the government 
to announce that it would reform the 
Marine Reserves Act by broadening its 
purpose and modernising its community 
consultation processes. More recently 
the minister has indicated to us that he 
will be putting that review of the Marine 
Reserves Act on hold. Instead, Minister 
Nick Smith intends to have a wider look 
at protected marine areas across our 
oceans resource extending beyond the 12-
nautical-mile limits. 
I believe that is the right way forward. 
Tinkering with a 1971 piece of legislation 
will be inadequate to meet the needs of the 
21st century. The 2002 bill is too limited 
as well as dated, and was discharged from 
Parliament earlier this year. We now 
need a process that looks at some of the 
exciting conservation opportunities on 
offer in our exclusive economic zone and 
The [Marine Reserves Act] was brought about by 
intensive lobbying from the scientific community, 
rather than as a result of government having a 
specific desire to implement measures for marine 
protection ...
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extended continental shelf. This exercise 
should be part of a wider national 
conversation about oceans reform. The 
successful approach on freshwater policy 
offers a useful indication of how getting 
competing interests into a room can work. 
I believe that such a conversation needs 
to look across the entire marine field, 
including aquaculture, fishing, recreation, 
minerals, shipping, conservation and 
pollution. EDS is scoping out such an 
exercise with both government and 
within civil society. 
The Auckland and Waikato councils 
have approved a marine spatial 
planning exercise for the Hauraki Gulf, 
the most intensively used part of our 
marine environment. This will follow 
a collaborative approach and will be a 
useful pilot for a wider national exercise.
Freshwater: then
In 1980 leaders of the environmental 
movement of the time felt that there was 
a need to be able to take a conservation 
initiative to protect rivers, instead of 
being limited to reacting to development 
proposals, especially for hydro generation, 
irrigation and aluminium smelters. The 
idea was to amend the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 to enable water 
conservation orders to be created to protect 
‘wild and scenic rivers’. The proposal had 
strong backing from the minister for the 
environment, Ian Shearer, and some other 
National MPs, including Paul East, Doug 
Kidd and Ian McLean. Ultimately it also 
had support from Energy Minister Bill 
Birch and Prime Minister Rob Muldoon.
I remember Bryce Johnson, from the 
acclimatisation societies, Guy Salmon 
and others actively lobbying around 
the Beehive for the creation of this new 
initiative. Some of us used the minister for 
the environment’s office as an informal 
campaign headquarters for weeks on 
end and lobbied across the House to get 
the support that was required to bring 
that bill to fruition. (How things have 
changed!)
The Water and Soil Amendment 
Act 1981 was passed and the first water 
conservation order, for the Motu River, 
was approved early in that decade. Those 
amendments were carried over into the 
Resource Management Act in 1991, and 
remain there. Today there are 15 water 
conservation orders, most of them as a 
result of acclimatisation societies and 
Fish and Game initiatives. 
The wild and scenic rivers law 
was enacted after some old-fashioned 
lobbying, gaining support of key 
parliamentarians, and a supportive public 
campaign which garnered widespread 
popular endorsement. It is a conservation 
initiative that has stood the test of time.
Freshwater: now
The broader issue of freshwater manage-
ment has been a challenge for policy-
makers for some years. A Sustainable 
Water Programme of Action led by the 
Ministry for the Environment between 
2003 and 2008 failed. Then, in 2008 at 
EDS’s annual conference, a group of 
diverse interests together decided that 
we had had enough of litigating our 
differences in the Environment Court. 
Parties as diverse as Fish and Game, Forest 
and Bird, EDS, Federated Farmers and 
Fonterra signed a communiqué which 
led to the creation of what was initially 
called the Sustainable Land Use Forum. 
This initiative secured the National-led 
government’s support and the Land and 
Water Forum was established. 
The Land and Water Forum brought 
all stakeholders who had an interest 
in freshwater, including, crucially, iwi 
leaders, into the room. After three 
years of an interesting, challenging 
and dynamic process, it had arrived at 
an agreed set of recommendations for 
freshwater reform, contained in three 
successive reports. Challenges during the 
process included the government creating 
a national policy statement on freshwater 
management which was a considerably 
weakened version of that recommended 
by its board of inquiry. That threatened 
to destroy the forum, with many on the 
green side thinking that we had been 
shafted. But we got over ourselves.
The 156 Land and Water Forum 
recommendations have now been passed 
on to the government with a strict caveat, 
supported by all, that it should not 
‘cherry pick’. What is required is that the 
government adopts the Land and Water 
Forum recommendations as a package. 
In its announcement of the first stages 
of reform it appeared that some cherry-
picking was, in fact, in prospect. In more 
recent times wiser heads are prevailing 
and the government has come back more 
directly to the forum’s recommendations. 
Crucially, the government’s discussion 
paper postulated a weakening of water 
conservation orders. There has since 
been some retreat from that position, 
with ‘ambiguity’ in the document being 
cited. Cabinet minutes show, however, 
that in the longer term the prospect of 
weakening water conservation orders 
remains. Given the history I have outlined 
and the fact that those orders are the only 
way we can take conservation initiatives 
for freshwater, any weakening will lead to 
very robust debate.
The Land and Water Forum was 
a collaborative process. Collaboration 
means getting everybody to change their 
minds. It necessarily involves the creation 
of a consensus, which means everybody’s 
position or opening gambit has to shift 
and that occurs through a process of 
dialogue, through understanding the 
background science more thoroughly, 
through understanding the competing 
pressures on the resource, and the need 
to be practical but at the same time have 
a trajectory that is going the right way. 
But having arrived in a relatively good 
place itself, the forum is now dependent 
on government for implementation, 
and that will take some years. The first 
tranche of decisions has been announced 
and is acceptable. There is still the risk, 
The Land and Water Forum brought all 
stakeholders who had an interest in freshwater, 
including, crucially, iwi leaders, into the room.
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though, that government will depart 
from the forum consensus, invoke a weak 
national objectives framework or make 
fundamental changes to the underlying 
legislation.
Resource management law: then
The second major environmental reform 
that occurred during the late 1980s was 
the creation of the Resource Management 
Act 1991 (RMA). This collapsed 78 existing 
statutes and regulations into a single 
omnibus piece of legislation governing 
the use of all air, land and water in New 
Zealand. It was then and is now world-
leading law.
It is worth first reflecting on a 
precursor to the act, the National 
Development Act 1979. That act allowed 
for the bypassing of planning procedures 
under the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1977. The long title of the National 
Development Act read:
 An Act to provide for the prompt 
consideration of proposed works of 
national importance by the direct 
referral of the proposals to the 
Planning Tribunal for an inquiry 
and report and by providing for 
such works to receive the necessary 
consents.
The Act applied to works which were 
considered by the Governor-General in 
Council to be ‘a major work that was 
likely to be in the national interest’, and 
where it was considered: 
(a) That the work is essential for the 
purposes of –
(i) The orderly production, 
development, or utilisation of 
New Zealand’s resources; or
(ii) The development of New 
Zealand’s self sufficiency in energy 
(other than atomic energy as 
defined in section 2 of the Atomic 
Energy Act 1945); or
(iii) The major expansion of exports 
or of import substitution; or
(iv) The development of significant 
opportunities for employment; 
and
(b) That it is essential a decision be 
made promptly as to whether or 
not the consents sought should be 
granted. (Section 3(3))
The Act required an environmental 
impact report to be prepared and 
audited. Strict time constraints were 
placed on the process. After the report 
was received, public notice was given of 
the inquiry and a wide range of parties 
were able to be heard. Under section 9 
the Planning Tribunal had to consider 
the same matters and give these the 
same weight as a consent authority if the 
applicant had applied for consents in the 
normal way. After the Planning Tribunal 
conducted the public inquiry and released 
its recommendations, the Governor-
General in Council could declare work 
to be of national importance and grant 
consents (with or without conditions). 
The governor-general in council only 
had to take into account the report 
and recommendation of the Planning 
Tribunal. There were restrictions on 
appeal rights – they had to be taken in 
the Court of Appeal and there was no 
appeal available from that decision. 
The National Development Act, which 
was repealed by the Labour government 
in 1986, sought to fast-track major 
energy-related projects. It has obvious 
parallels today.
The Resource Management Act 
was initially the brainchild of the 1987 
Labour government’s minister for the 
environment, Geoffrey Palmer. He 
produced a 314-page bill which was 
introduced into Parliament in 1988. When 
the government changed in 1990, the 
new minister for the environment in the 
National government, Simon Upton, took 
over the process. He set up an advisory 
group whose members included Tony 
Randerson, now a judge in the Court 
of Appeal, and Guy Salmon: the group 
was, if you like, the equivalent of what 
we would call a technical advisory group 
today. The review panel recommended 
some changes, which were largely adopted 
by the government. In his third reading 
speech to the House, Simon Upton made 
the following observations:
The Bill provides us with a 
framework to establish objectives 
with a biophysical bottom line that 
must not be compromised. Provided 
that those objectives are met, what 
people get up to is their affair. As 
such, the Bill provides a more liberal 
regime for developers. On the other 
hand, activities will have to be 
compatible with hard environmental 
standards and society will set those 
standards. Clause 4 sets out the 
biophysical bottom line. Clauses 5 
and 6 set out further specific matters 
that expand on the issues. The Bill 
has a clear and rigorous procedure 
for the setting of environmental 
standards – and the debate will be 
concentrating on just where we set 
those standards. (Upton, 1991)
The act was passed with bipartisan 
support from both National and Labour 
and came into force in 1991. 
The Resource Management Act came 
about through a fairly conventional pro-
cess. Environmental groups had been ac-
tive in lobbying for its creation, and it 
was an idea that had merit and whose 
time had come. It reflected modern in-
ternational thinking about sustainability 
and embodied the environmental values 
emerging then in the wider community. 
It also embraced a move away from cen-
tralised, override planning, most notice-
ably evident in the National Develop-
ment Act. It reached across the political 
spectrum and got bipartisan support in 
our pre-MMP Parliament. It has retained 
that support until very recently.
Resource management law: now
The poor old RMA has gone through 
reform after reform, and I must say, as 
a user of it, that it is difficult to navigate 
The Resource Management Act ... got bipartisan 
support in out pre-MMP Parliament. It has retained 
that support until recently.
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and is hardly a model of statutory 
drafting. But it does not deserve all the 
bad press it gets, which is often based on 
exaggeration, self-serving commentary 
and misrepresentation. 
There are four current reforms that I 
want to address.
Resource Management Reform Bill 
The government introduced the Resource 
Management Reform Bill in 2012. This 
bill, among a number of other changes, 
creates a fast-track process for the 
Auckland Unitary Plan, makes changes 
to section 32 of the RMA, and seeks to 
further restrict the ability of councils to 
protect trees in urban areas by overriding 
a 2011 Environment Court decision. At 
the time of writing the select committee 
has reported on the bill and it is awaiting 
its committee stages in the Parliament. 
Few changes were made and there was 
no agreement between parties on the 
controversial elements. The restrictions 
on tree protection are particularly 
controversial. The amendments mean 
that protected trees must be identified in 
a schedule listing the land they are located 
on and describing the tree or group of trees. 
The amendments appear to be intended to 
make tree protection more difficult so as to 
discourage councils from tree protection. 
It is creating bureaucratic obstacles rather 
than simplifying processes.
Technical advisory group on sections 6 and 7
The next round of RMA reforms began 
with the minister for the environment 
appointing a technical advisory group in 
October 2011 to review sections 6 and 7 of 
the RMA. The group’s terms of reference 
were to: 
provide independent advice to the 
Minister for the Environment on any 
changes needed to sections 6 and 7 of 
the RMA to improve the functioning 
of the RMA relative to: 20 years’ 
practical experience of its operation; 
the Government’s environmental 
and economic objectives; and the 
broader second phase of resource 
management reforms. (Minister 
for the Environment’s Resource 
Management Act 1991 Principles 
Technical Advisory Group, 2012)
The technical advisory group report 
was released July 2012 and made a number 
of controversial recommendations. The 
key recommendations were:
1. combining sections 6 and 7 and 
removing the existing hierarchy 
between the two sets of principles;
2. removing directive terms such as 
‘protect’ and ‘maintain’;
3. removing a number of existing 
principles, including ‘maintaining 
and enhancing amenity values’;
4. adding a number of principles 
relating to the benefits to be derived 
from the use and development 
of resources, infrastructure, and 
the built environment and urban 
expansion;
5. adding a new section addressing 
matters of ‘process’, including a 
requirement for decision-makers 
to ‘achieve an appropriate balance 
between public and private interests 
in the use of land’. (Ibid.) 
Prior to the release of the government’s 
technical advisory group report, EDS 
convened its own advisory group, 
which included a more experienced 
multi-disciplinary team of resource 
management professionals, including a 
former High Court Judge, with the same 
terms of reference as the minister’s. The 
EDS technical advisory group came to 
substantially different conclusions. It 
considered that providing for economic 
or social outcomes in section 6 was 
undesirable because it would increase 
the likelihood of conflict between 
section 6 matters, introduce uncertainty 
and lead to more litigation. It would 
also run counter to the approach of 
focusing on the effects of activities on the 
environment, rather than attempting to 
direct or provide for certain economic or 
social outcomes (Environmental Defence 
Society Technical Advisory Group, 2012).
The government released its propos-
als for the stage two RMA reforms in its 
discussion document Improving Our Re-
source Management System in February 
this year (Ministry for the Environment, 
2013). It received about 14,000 submis-
sions. There are a number of proposals in 
the discussion document which are likely 
to improve our resource management 
system, including a national template for 
resource management plans, standard 
definitions, and more mandatory time-
lines for processing resource consents. 
However, some of the proposals are deep-
ly troubling and if implemented are likely 
to lower environmental standards across 
New Zealand. Of most concern are:
• The proposed changes to the 
principles of the RMA (contained in 
sections 6 and 7), including:
(a) removing the hierarchy between 
section 6 (matters of national 
importance) and section 7 (other 
matters);
(b) deleting core environmental 
principles, including the 
‘maintenance and enhancement of 
amenity values’, ‘intrinsic values 
of ecosystems’ and ‘the ethic of 
stewardship’;
(c) adding new development 
principles, including ‘the efficient 
provision of infrastructure’.
• Proposals to increase the powers of 
ministers while reducing the rights 
of communities and the role of the 
Environment Court, including:
(a) granting ministers greater powers 
to intervene in plan-making 
processes, including powers to 
specify the outcome of a plan-
making process and directly 
amend an operative plan through 
regulations;
There are a number of proposals in the discussion 
document which are likely to improve our resource 
management system, including ... more mandatory 
timelines for processing resource consents. 
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(b) introducing limitations on the 
scope of submissions and appeal 
rights;
(c) reducing the role of the 
Environment Court by:
- changing appeals from de 
novo (considered afresh) to a 
rehearing (considered on the 
basis of evidence presented at 
the council hearing);
- removing merit appeal rights 
where a single resource 
management plan is produced.
Consultation on the RMA discussion 
document has now closed. A summary 
report is anticipated imminently and we 
expect a bill to be released in the coming 
months.
The Housing Accords and Special Housing 
Areas Bill 
Along with the troubling RMA reforms, 
we also have a proposed RMA override 
bill. The Housing Accords and Special 
Housing Areas Bill was introduced largely 
in response to the perceived housing 
crisis in Auckland. The purpose of this 
bill is ‘to enhance housing affordability 
by facilitating an increase in land and 
housing supply in certain regions or 
districts … identified as having housing 
supply and affordability issues’. It provides 
for the government to enter into a housing 
accord with councils and then to establish 
special housing areas in which planning 
provisions will be weakened to enable 
resource consents to be obtained.
We have real concerns with this: 
• Once a special housing area 
is identified, there will be an 
expectation that development will 
be allowed; however, the bill does 
not put in place any requirements to 
consider environmental effects (or 
social or economic effects) during 
the identification of special housing 
areas.
• When a resource consent is 
considered in a special housing 
area, the bill does not require 
application of the RMA or plans. 
Instead, the decision-maker only 
has to have regard to these matters, 
and can disregard them in the 
name of affordable housing. Public 
participation is highly restricted. 
This can only lead to poor social and 
environmental outcomes – or slums.
In addition, the bill allows the 
government to create special housing 
areas and undertake resource consenting 
on its own where it cannot reach a 
housing accord with a council. The bill 
also limits appeal rights considerably.
The New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Amendment Act 2013 
I want now to step outside environmental 
law for a moment to highlight where 
the trend might be going with respect to 
public access to the law. The New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Amendment 
Act 2013 amends the New Zealand Public 
Health and Disability Act 2000, which 
provides for the public funding and 
provision of health services and disability 
support services. The amendment is a 
response to a Court of Appeal decision 
that the policy of not paying family 
carers to provide support services to 
disabled family members constituted 
unjustifiable discrimination on the basis 
of family status. This legislation was 
rushed through Parliament: it was passed 
the day it was introduced. There was no 
select committee process for the public to 
participate in, which completely ignored 
proper process in a situation where there 
was no need for such extreme haste.
Significantly, the legislation contains 
provisions which limit the rights of 
people to seek redress when they believe 
that certain rights set out in the Human 
Rights Act 1993 and the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (freedom from discrimination on 
the basis of marital status, disability, age 
or family status) have been breached by 
the act or decisions made under it. 
In respect of such allegations, ‘no 
complaint based in whole or in part on 
a specified allegation may be made to 
the Human Rights Commission, and no 
proceedings based in whole or in part on 
a specified allegation may be commenced 
or continued in any court or tribunal’ 
(section 70(E)(2) as amended). This is an 
ouster clause, which restricts the ability of 
persons to test the legality of decisions in 
the courts, including by judicial review. 
It is constitutionally obnoxious and the 
Legislation Advisory Committee has 
emphasised that such clauses should be 
used only in exceptional cases (Legislation 
Advisory Committee, 2001, chapter 13).
The overall trend with RMA and 
related reforms is one of weakening the 
core legislation, fast-tracking consenting 
and plan-making, limiting rights of public 
participation and legal standing, reducing 
the role of the Environment Court, 
replacing it with politically-appointed 
commissioners in many instances, 
limiting rights of appeal, and picking 
winners (mostly from the resources 
sectors). If this sounds like the national 
development era revisited by stealth, then 
it is. We are slowly seeing a usurpation 
of decision-making powers by ministers, 
a commensurate reduction in the role of 
the courts, a reversing of the doctrine of 
subsidiarity and an overall lowering of 
environmental standards. 
The RMA reforms, including the 
Housing Accord Bill (and the Public 
Health and Disability Amendment Act) 
are examples that demonstrate that the 
government is becoming more radical 
and is willing to ride rough-shod over due 
process. All this has big environmental 
implications. It is absolutely true that 
in the resource management world we 
are seeing a revisiting of the ‘Think Big’ 
era, with the same emphasis on resource 
extraction and fast-tracking approval 
processes in constitutionally questionable, 
if not obnoxious, ways.
Conclusions
There is a wide range of ways in which en-
vironmental policy and law has been made 
The RMA reforms ... are examples that demonstrate 
that the government is becoming more radical and 
is willing to ride rough-shod over due process. 
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over the past 30 years. They include bipar-
tisan agreements between political parties 
(these days we would say multi-partisan 
agreements); old-fashioned lobbying with 
town hall meetings, pamphlets and pres-
suring individual MPs towards a point of 
view; working creatively with like-minded 
parliamentarians within the parliamenta-
ry precinct to build agreement with their 
colleagues on initiatives they are prepared 
to support; preparing, well in advance of 
the issue becoming contemporary, well-
thought-out policy papers that influence 
the way that policy and law is made; stra-
tegic litigation; and using advisory groups 
to assist ministers with advice on how to 
proceed.
There is another way to make good 
policy: through collaboration. This 
concept is relatively new to New Zealand, 
having been imported from Scandinavia 
by Guy Salmon. It had its first run in 
the Land and Water Forum, but has 
morphed into wider use: the Mackenzie 
Country Shared Vision Forum; Auckland 
Council’s Transport Funding Group; 
and the proposed Hauraki Gulf Marine 
Spatial Planning Forum. In collaborative 
processes, if all the stakeholders agree on 
a reform prescription they are much more 
likely to get cross-party support, which is 
what has largely happened with freshwater. 
Policy is also likely to be more enduring 
over time. This is the opposite of short-
term opportunistic policy gaming. The 
oil and gas sector is engaging in that. It is 
trying to get the easiest set of regulations 
it can to enable its activities over the next 
few years. The upshot will be a massive 
lurch in the opposite direction when the 
government changes, as they do. 
We will also see a swift and determined 
change of direction on climate change 
when the government changes. Sleeping 
on something that important is not a 
durable position for a country to take. If 
ministers are going to insist on changes to 
part 2 of the RMA, which many experts, 
including Sir Geoffrey Palmer, say will 
lower environmental standards, then 
there will be a repeal of those provisions 
when the government changes. But 
constant change is destabilising and 
creates investment uncertainty. It is not 
good to have extreme policy lurches.
So what about a collaborative 
approach towards RMA reform? What 
about a collaborative approach around 
the oil and gas regulations, where we 
actually get to sit down with the sector 
and the government and its advisors 
and talk about what can work and what 
does not work for everybody, rather 
than proceeding on a deep suspicion 
that multinationals are calling the shots 
for short-term advantage? What about a 
collaborative process around the really big 
environmental policy issue which is still 
before us – namely, oceans management?
My contention is that some of these 
big environmental policy decisions are 
too big to play politics with; that it is 
time for civil society to undertake more 
of the kind of collaborative processes 
that we have seen emerging. We should 
take more of the initiative around 
our precious environment away from 
direct government control and initiate 
civil society-led reform. We should see 
government as a servant rather than 
a master and initiate more Land and 
Water Forum-type exercises. In the 
meantime, the government needs to 
moderate its extremist incursions on the 
environment. 
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